Washington: Where It Stands Among States With Fee Caps

A reasonableness-only state for fees

Compare Washington to a state like New York, which applies a hard statutory sliding scale to medical malpractice attorney fees specifically. Washington has no equivalent figure anywhere in its rules — the fee simply must be reasonable under RPC 1.5, assessed case by case, for both ordinary personal injury and malpractice claims.

A consistent philosophy, not a coincidence

Washington struck down its own legislative noneconomic damages cap as unconstitutional in 1989, holding that the amount of damages is a question for the jury, not a statutory formula. That same resistance to legislative limits carries through to attorney fees: a 1995 bill to cap personal injury contingency fees by statute never passed either, leaving RPC 1.5's reasonableness standard as the sole governing rule on both fronts.

Two separate questions, both left uncapped

In a state that caps both damages and fees, the two questions interact: a fee percentage applies to a recovery that's already been reduced to a statutory ceiling. Washington's situation is simpler — neither cap exists for ordinary personal injury claims, so both the damages a claimant recovers and the percentage the attorney charges on that recovery are determined without a legislative ceiling on either end.

A narrow, genuine exception elsewhere

Washington does draw a real distinction for workers' compensation, where attorney fees are governed by a specific statute (RCW 51.52.120) rather than RPC 1.5's general standard. That exception doesn't extend to ordinary personal injury or medical malpractice contingency fees, which remain governed solely by the reasonableness test.

Washington's fee structure — frequently asked questions

Does Washington cap attorney fees in medical malpractice cases the way some states do?

No. Unlike states that write a specific percentage ceiling into statute for malpractice fees, Washington applies only the general RPC 1.5 reasonableness standard, with no fixed cap for ordinary personal injury or malpractice claims.

Is Washington's uncapped approach to personal injury fees typical among states?

It's one of two common approaches nationally. Many states rely on a general reasonableness standard for personal injury contingency fees, while others, particularly for medical malpractice, write a specific percentage ceiling into statute.

Does Washington's lack of a damages cap say anything about its fee rules?

They're governed by separate rules, but together they form a consistent pattern — Washington struck down its own noneconomic damages cap as unconstitutional in 1989 and has never enacted a statutory cap on ordinary personal injury contingency fees either.

Does a damages cap affect the attorney's own fee on that portion of a claim?

In states with both a damages cap and a fee cap, the damages cap limits what the client can recover; the fee question is still a separate calculation. In Washington, neither cap exists for ordinary personal injury claims.

Has a contingency fee cap ever come close to passing in Washington?

Yes — a 1995 bill proposed a sliding-scale cap on personal injury contingency fees, but it did not pass. Washington has never enacted such a cap for ordinary personal injury cases.

This page provides general guidance only and is not legal advice. Figures are based on RPC 1.5 of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct and Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636 (1989), verified per our methodology. Confirm how current rules apply to a specific claim with a licensed attorney in the relevant state before acting.